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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






LINDA RIZZO-RUPON; SUSAN MARSHALL;  





INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS,  
AFL-CIO DISTRICT 141, LOCAL 914;  
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS 
DISTRICT LODGE 141; 
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AEROSPACE WORKERS AFL-CIO 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 2-19-cv-00221) 
Honorable William J. Martini, U.S. District Judge 
__________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
on September 18, 2020 
 
Before: KRAUSE, RESTREPO, and BIBAS, Circuit Judges 
 
 















KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
Under the Railway Labor Act’s agency-fee provision, private-sector employers and 
unions may enter agreements requiring non-union employees to finance union activities.  
See 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh(b).  In keeping with that provision, United Airlines 
authorizes Appellees International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-
CIO, IAM District Lodge 141, and IAM Local 914 to collect fees from United’s non-union 
employees.  Appellants, who pay fees under that agreement, argue that the Act amounts to 
a facial violation of the First Amendment.  Because the District Court correctly recognized 
that controlling precedent precludes Appellants’ claim, we will affirm.   
A. Discussion1   
We begin with a premise that Appellants do not dispute:  If Railway Employes’ 
Department v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956), remains good law, it bars Appellants’ First 
Amendment challenge.    In Hanson, the Supreme Court held that the Railway Labor Act’s 
“requirement for financial support of the collective-bargaining agency by all who receive 
the benefits of its work . . . does not violate [] the First [Amendment].”  Id. at 238.  And as 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under 
Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.  See Mid-Am. Salt, LLC v. Morris Cty. Coop. 
Pricing Council, 964 F.3d 218, 226 (3d Cir. 2020).    
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the Court has since clarified, while Hanson did not preclude as-applied challenges to the 
Act, see Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express & 
Station Emps., 466 U.S. 435, 456 (1984); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 
748–49 (1961), it did foreclose claims, like Appellants’, that attack only “the constitutional 
validity of [the Act] on its face,” Street, 367 U.S. at 748 (citing Hanson, 351 U.S. at 238); 
see Bolden v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 953 F.2d 807, 827 (3d Cir. 1991) (en banc).  
Recognizing as much, Appellants contend instead, based on a trio of recent Supreme 
Court opinions, that Hanson has been overruled.  A review of those cases, however, makes 
apparent that it has not—at least not yet. 
Appellants rely primarily on Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and 
Municipal Employees, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018), where the Supreme Court 
invalidated longstanding precedent permitting public-sector unions to force non-members 
to pay agency fees.  Id. at 2478 (overruling Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 
(1977)).  But Janus took pains to distinguish Hanson, emphasizing that the “private-sector 
union shops” analyzed in Hanson presented “a very different First Amendment question” 
than the public-sector unions at issue in Janus.  Id. at 2479 (emphasis retained).   
Nor does Knox v. Service Employees International Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298 
(2012), support Appellants’ position.  In that case, the Court considered “whether the First 
Amendment allows a public-sector union to require objecting nonmembers to pay a special 
fee for the purpose of financing the union’s political and ideological activities.”  Id. at 302 
(emphasis added).  Consistent with its focus on public-sector unions, Knox never even cited 
Hanson, let alone overruled it.    
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 That leaves Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616 (2014), the third and final case Appellants 
read as invalidating Hanson.    But Harris says nothing of the kind.  Like its predecessors, 
Harris reaffirmed Hanson’s determination that the Act “was constitutional in its bare 
authorization of union-shop contracts requiring workers to give financial support to 
unions.”  Id. at 636 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  In other words, the 
Court understood Hanson as holding that the Act does not violate the First Amendment on 
its face, but may be susceptible to as-applied challenges.   
As a fallback position, Appellants maintain that even if Janus, Knox, and Harris do 
not explicitly overrule Hanson, they undermine its reasoning.  Whatever the merits of this 
argument, however, the Supreme Court alone retains “the prerogative of overruling its own 
decisions.”  Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).  
Unless and until that happens, Hanson remains binding precedent.2   
B.      Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order of dismissal.   
 
2 The District Court dismissed the complaint on two alternative grounds: first, that 
Appellees are not state actors, and second, that Hanson forecloses facial First Amendment 
challenges to the Act.  Having determined that Hanson resolves this appeal, we see no need 
to reach the state actor issue.  In addition, because Plaintiffs have not contested the 
dismissal of their Fifth Amendment claim, we deem that claim abandoned and need not 
discuss it here.  See Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 677 F.3d 519, 545 (3d Cir. 2012). 
